Product Description

Was the Civil War really the birthplace of modern battlefield tactics? Paddy Griffith argues that despite the use of new weapons and of trench warfare techniques, the Civil War was in reality the last Napoleonic-style war. Rich in description and analysis, this is a book of interest both to military historians and to Civil War buffs.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #390614 in Books
• Published on: 2001-03-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 240 pages

Review
"Belongs on the shelf of every historian, Civil War buff, and military tactician." -- Maj. James T. Currie, Army

"Provides a fresh and provocative appraisal of the [Civil] War. . . . An essential read for anyone interested in the subject." -- Military History Illustrated

About the Author
Paddy Griffith, formerly a senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England, is the author of several other books on military subjects, including Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, published by Yale University Press.

Customer Reviews

Take The Good With The Bad
Griffith's book certainly makes some good points, but there's plenty of bad mixed in. Since so many have discussed what they believe is good about this book, I'll list my reservations. In addition to others who did a review of this book, I also suggest reading Archer Jones's "Civil War Command And Strategy" as a complementary book, since the latter breaks down the campaigns tactically while this book breaks down the battles.

Field Fortifications - Griffith essentially concludes that field fortifications were a psychological deterrent more than a physical one. Often Griffith states that fieldworks didn't create a big advantage, and in doing this he cites figures on how many people were hit per minute or per shot fired. In other parts of this chapter, he claims that armies were too quick to dig in, even if they were on the offensive. With Jones pointing out how invaluable counter attacks were, and with Shiloh proving that point, I disagree with Griffith there as well. Finally, Griffith seems to ignore that multiple lines of fieldwork were generally put up at places like Gettysburg and Chancellorsville. To sustain big losses to take one set of works doesn't automatically grant a side the strategic or even tactical victory, as the Confederates proved on Culp's Hill on 2 July 1863.

Cavalry - Griffith seems to take others to task for their "romantic lore" over how they view the CW. I wholeheartedly disagree with his conclusion that Civil War cavalry should have been used on the battlefield in condensed charges more often. In making his point, he often hearkens back to Napoleonic times, yet he conveniently omits any mention of how devestated the Grande Armee was at Waterloo by using that tactic. Griffith disregards the obstacle that fieldworks would have made on a cavalry charge by saying horses could jump them. I'd suggest to Griffith that he reads Keegan's chapters on cavalry in "The Face Of Battle."

Finally there were just minor inconsistencies peppered throughout the book, whether negating the importance of Union raiding that mostly commenced in 1864, or suggesting Lee was "hardly surprised" by Hooker's Grand Plan when both Lee and Stuart corresponded in the beginning stages of the Chancellorsville campaign that they didn't know what Hooker was up to.

I'm not going to pretend that these faults were made simply because the guy was British, or that he's either subjectively or objectively biased. I think he simply jumps to conclusions before he can ably prove them.

Flawed but innovative view of the Civil War
Paddy Griffith's thesis is essentially that from a weapons and tactics point of view the Civil War was the last Napoleonic War rather than the first modern war. He points to the similarity in weapons, tactics, and similarities between how battles were fought and wars were conducted. In Griffith's eyes, both Union and Confederate leaders were rather inferior to their Napoleonic counterparts, being too addicted to defensive entrenchments and not nearly aggressive enough (he frequently uses the term "tyranny of the engineers"). Needless to say his conclusions are controversial but his book is worth reading because it is an "outsider's" view of "our" war and because some of his insights are dead on. His chapter on the evolution of drill manuals and their reliance on French authors is particularly insightful.

On the other hand, some of his ideas are insane. He believes that the rifled musket made little to no difference in how battles were bought, that soldiers who refused to attack entrenchments later in the war were cowardly, and that few generals on either side were worth their weight in brass, and that railroads and telegraphs made little difference in the way the war was conducted, and that the side on the offense usually won, among other thoughts.

This is a good book to read along with McWhitney and Jamieson's Attack and Die, which reaches exactly the opposite conclusion: that the South lost the war primarily because it was so addicted to the attack. Both books contain good research and thoughts but make sweeping generalizations that render their research and insights all but useless. Go figure.

A Euro-centric view of the ACW
A Sandhurst Lecturer turns his attention to the ACW - attempting to put this internal war of the former British colonies in the larger perspective of western warfare of the 19th and early 20th centuries. It is always a valuable, interesting exercise when a knowledgeable historian adopts a contrarian approach to debunking generally accepted opinions. Griffith sets his sights on a wide spectrum of targets, including: the ACW was the precursor to trench warfare in WW I; the ACW was one of unusual ferocity because of the development and employment of new technology (e.g. rifled barrels); the ACW was the first "modern" war. Unfortunately, Griffith misses many of his targets. Much insight is provided with regard to the conduct of battles in terms of the ranges at which forces were engaged, tactical and logistical problems encountered, effectiveness of different arms and tactics and percentages of casualties incurred. One point very well made is that ACW armies should have developed shock troops and chase troops for precipitating break-throughs in offensive campaigns and pursuing defeated armies to realize more decisive results. Too many ACW battles realized severe casualties without strategic results. However, when Griffith concludes that the ACW was in every way similar to any four-year period of the Napoleanic wars on the European continent, he betrays his Euro-centric bias. Obviously, the ACW was conducted on the basis of Napoleanic tactics - which was the accepted doctrine of the time, preached by West Point. However, Griffith tailors the facts to suit his own ends. There is not even any mention of Longstreet's developed views on defensive warfare. Griffith would have us believe that field fortifications were of psychological significance only - tell that to the Billy Yanks that made assaults at Fredricksburg and Vicksburg and Cold Harbor! (Another obvious mistake: Griffith would have us believe that N. B. Forrest actually said "fustest with the mostest" - and his &quo! t;reference" for this quote is a criticism of second-hand essays! This type of research would be graded "F" in an undergraduate history course - much less a published professional treatise.) Let the reader beware while enjoying this view from Britain (still looking down with a condescending view of the former colonies).