Product Description

Evaluates Lincoln's ability as a director of war and his influence on the development of a modern command system.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #701730 in Books
• Published on: 1967-02-12
• Released on: 1967-02-12
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback

Review
"An admirably planned and executed work which well fulfills the author's expressed hope that it will contribute both to the history and to the understanding of the American system."

American Historical Review

"The author's conclusions about Lincoln's war strategy are sometimes controversial, but his presentation is convincing. As a scholar Mr. Williams has drawn his facts from fundamental sources, and as a story-teller he displays a craftsmanship that holds the reader in suspense even when he knows exactly how the incident ends."

The New York Times

"It is an able and a fascinating book that Mr. Williams has given us. Although it presents the thesis of Lincoln's superior strategic grasp, it is not an argumentative volume. Rather, it is a full-bodied, swift-paced narrative....The reader will gain as clear and shrewd an overall comprehension of the Northern effort from this volume as from any other in print. And most readers will close the book, we believe, accepting the author's thesis."

Allan Nevins, Saturday Review -- Review

Review
"An admirably planned and executed work which well fulfills the author's expressed hope that it will contribute both to the history and to the understanding of the American system."

American Historical Review

"The author's conclusions about Lincoln's war strategy are sometimes controversial, but his presentation is convincing. As a scholar Mr. Williams has drawn his facts from fundamental sources, and as a story-teller he displays a craftsmanship that holds the reader in suspense even when he knows exactly how the incident ends."

The New York Times

"It is an able and a fascinating book that Mr. Williams has given us. Although it presents the thesis of Lincoln's superior strategic grasp, it is not an argumentative volume. Rather, it is a full-bodied, swift-paced narrative....The reader will gain as clear and shrewd an overall comprehension of the Northern effort from this volume as from any other in print. And most readers will close the book, we believe, accepting the author's thesis."

Allan Nevins, Saturday Review

From the Publisher
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Customer Reviews

Won't Someone Bring This Classic Back Into Print?
"Lincoln and His Generals" is an absolute must for anyone who aspires to a true understanding of the American Civil War and how it was fought, especially from the high command perspective on the Union side. Poring over the orders that passed back and forth between Lincoln and his top commanders, Williams paints a highly opinionated portrait of Lincoln's efforts to find the commander who will at last win the war. Williams' portrait of McClellan is extensive - and unforgiving. How this classic study could have been allowed to pass exclusively into the realm of the used book seller is a mystery to this reviewer.

The Definitive work on Lincoln as Commander In Chief
In Lincoln and His Generals, T. Harry Williams concentrated on telling the story of Lincoln as commander in chief during America's greatest and most devastating war. In the preface he states his goals clearly; "my theme is Lincoln as a director of war and his place in the high command and his influence in developing a modern command system for his nation." Williams expertly develops this theme throughout this fascinating book. Though many may disagree with some of his conclusions about how effective Lincoln was in this role, few, after reading this book, would dispute the fact that it is a well written and reasoned account of the topic, and that it is an important contribution both to Civil War and Lincoln studies.
William's views Lincoln as a genius - a man, who came into office with no military knowledge, yet had the flexibility of mind to adapt and learn from his mistakes to guide his country to victory through its greatest wartime crisis. He states that, "Lincoln, by the power of his mind, became a fine strategist...a better natural strategist than were most of the trained soldiers." He claims that Lincoln grasped the war's big picture from the very beginning, and even claims that Grant's final end-game strategy from 1864 on was fundamentally Lincoln's plan, though the details and execution were Grant's. I believe that he overreaches with some of these claims, yet he still makes a great case for Lincoln's genius, and his role as the indispensable man behind Union victory.
Williams also writes of the generals who were Lincoln's tools for winning the war. McClellan and Grant get the most ink, the former because, despite his great talent, he was ultimately a failure and Lincoln's greatest disappointment and the latter because, in William's estimation, he was the greatest general on either side of the war. Of Lincoln's other generals, Williams writes more about the ineffective, incompetent ones such as Fremont and Banks than he does of effective and even great generals like Sherman and Thomas. He explains in his preface that the reason for this is that the incompetent generals were headaches to Lincoln, forcing him to have intimate command relationships with them, while he had to interfere very little with the moves of the effective Sherman and Thomas.
Whether or not you agree with all or even any of the author's conclusions, he has written what still stands as the definitive work on this topic - the launching point for discussion and debate on Lincoln's role as commander in chief. Not only that, he has done it in fine style, creating a clear, interesting, and well-written book that stands as a masterpiece in its field. I give it my highest recommendation.

Theo Logos

The war from the top
An absolutely engrossing explanation of how Lincoln and his top generals fought the Civil War and how the war forced the adoption of a modern command structure.

If you've seen pictures of Lincoln when elected in 1861 and compared them to pictures from 1865 and wondered why he looked so worn, here's the answer: he had generals (and oh what generals they were!).

The fault I find is that it gives too much emphasis to Mclellan and most of the remaining attention to Grant. While these were the major Generals in Chief, I would have liked to have seen more on the other generals who served under them.