Product Description

Reviewed and debated everywhere, this book has become a key volume in the case for a new policy of interventionism.

America's "small wars," "imperial wars," or, as the Pentagon now terms them, "low-intensity conflicts," have played an essential but little-appreciated role in its growth as a world power. Beginning with Jefferson's expedition against the Barbary Pirates, Max Boot tells the exciting stories of our sometimes minor but often bloody landings in Samoa, the Philippines, China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Russia, and elsewhere. Along the way he sketches colorful portraits of little-known military heroes such as Stephen Decatur, "Fighting Fred" Funston, and Smedley Butler.

From 1800 to the present day, such undeclared wars have made up the vast majority of our military engagements. Yet the military has often resisted preparing itself for small wars, preferring instead to train for big conflicts that seldom come. Boot re-examines the tragedy of Vietnam through a "small war" prism. He concludes with a devastating critique of the Powell Doctrine and a convincing argument that the armed forces must reorient themselves to better handle small-war missions, because such clashes are an inevitable result of America's far-flung imperial responsibilities.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #192673 in Books
• Published on: 2003-05
• Released on: 2003-05-27
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 464 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780465007219
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Amazon.com Review
Whether fought for commercial or strategic concessions or even moral reasons, whether little-known or well-publicized, America's "small wars"--against, say, the Barbary pirates and the rebellious Boxers--played a large part in the development of what historian Max Boot does not hesitate to call an American empire. All arguments to the contrary, Boot insists, America has never been an isolationist power; it has "been involved in other countries' internal affairs since at least 1805," when American marines landed on the shores of Tripoli, and it has "never confined the use of force to those situations that meet the narrow definition of American interests preferred by realpolitikers and isolationists." Closely examining the record of those small wars, which far outnumber major conflicts, Boot argues that Americans have a historic duty to deliver foreign nations from aggression, even to intervene in civil wars abroad, especially if the product is greater freedom--for, he writes, "a world of liberal democracies would be a world much more amenable to American interests than any conceivable alternative." Readers may take issue with some of Boot's conclusions, but they merit wide discussion, especially in a time when small--and perhaps large--wars are looming. Boot's book is thus timely, and most instructive. --Gregory McNamee

From Publishers Weekly
As editorial features editor of the Wall Street Journal, Boot (Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench) has a reputation as a fire-breathing polemicist and unabashed imperialist. This book addresses America's "small wars" in chronological order, dividing the action from 1801 to the present into three sections ("Commercial Power," "Great Power" and "Superpower") to argue that "small war missions are militarily doable" and are now in fact a necessity. Beginning with a description of going to work on September 11 as the World Trade Center tragedy displaced the WSJ newsroom, Boot quickly gets down to some historical detail: from the U.S. expedition against the Barbary pirates to violent squabbles in Panama, Samoa, the Philippines, China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Beirut, Grenada, Somalia and Bosnia. Examples of wars "that were fought less than `wholeheartedly,' " of wars "without exit strategies" and wars "in which U.S. soldiers act as `social workers' " are decried. Each of the 15 short chapters might have been the focus of a separate in-depth book, so Boot's take is once over very lightly indeed. While America's and the world's small wars certainly seem more and more related, Boot's historical descriptions are too thin to provide a solid foundation for relating one war to another.

From Library Journal
The United States has the opportunity to establish a Pax Americana in today's world by jettisoning the Powell doctrine, named after Colin Powell when he was chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and emphasizing military deployment under limited conditions, and instead instituting an aggressive "small wars" strategy. So argues Boot, Wall Street Journal editorial features editor and author of Out of Order. Boot says that small wars, or "low-intensity conflicts," are about "the tactics employed, not the scale of combat" and that they have long been a part of the American story he in fact details several of the more than 100 small wars that America has waged since 1800. Boot claims the marines once had a small-wars manual and were such masters of small-wars tactics that, had such tactics been applied widely in Vietnam, America might have won that war. Although the political-moral ramifications of his argument as related to domestic affairs need more exploration, Boot has written a readable and thought-provoking book one that might well influence the behind-the-scenes debates over the future of military policy, as he hopes. Recommended for public and academic libraries. Charles L. Lumpkins, Pennsylvania State Univ., State College
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

Customer Reviews

Enlightening and Very Well Written
"The Savage Wars of Peace" is a book that is likely to surprise all but the most ardent military history buffs. Once and for all it does away with the myth that before World War Two, America was completely "isolationist" in its foreign policy. The book focuses on America's many "smaller" military actions, from the Tripolitan War circa 1801-1803 to the hundred years (1840-1941) that American troops were continuously stationed in China to the Phillippine "Insurrection" (1900-1902) to the many 20th Century American interventions in Latin America.

Surprises abound, the biggest being how Author Max Boot demonstrates that for the most part America's interventions happened for idealistic reasons, rather than the usual sterotype that has the U.S. always watching out for big business interests. Also surprising is Boot's account of how effective America was at fighting anti-guerilla wars, at least up until Vietnam, when our misguided tactics may have actually snatched victory from our grasp. Boot covers each intervention seperately, combining politics with actual battle narratives in an excellently readable manner. Colorful figures emerge, like "The Fight Quaker" Marine General Smedley Butler, who for over thirty years was America's foremost (and most successful) guerilla fighter, only to become a staunch pacifist upon retirement.

Though it is a historical narrative, it is obvious that the author is trying to send a message to today's military leaders, especially in the wake of such misguided post-Vietnam policies as the "Powell Doctorine." The message is that America has a duty to continue to fight small wars to make the world a safer place (especially after September 11th), but that it should also not encorage our enemies by cutting and running from such engagements after the first casualties.

Overall, Boot has wrtitten and extremely enjoyable military history book that carries with it a powerful message.

When Will We Finally Learn?
For non-scholars such as I who have a keen interest in U.S. military history, this book provides information and analysis which are probably not available in any other single volume. Boot tracks various "small wars" during the rise of America's global power from the Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815) until the application of the "Powell Doctrine" during the Gulf War in the 1990s. In the final chapter, he then provides what he calls "In Defense of the Pax Americana: Small Wars in the Twenty-First Century." Boot identifies four (among several) distinct types of small wars: Punitive ("to punish attacks on American citizens or property), Protective ("to safeguard foreign territory"), Pacification ("to occupy foreign territory"), and Profiteering ("To grab trade or or territorial concession"). For me, one of the book's greatest strengths is comprised of Boot's analysis of lesser-known but uniquely important historical figures such as Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Smedley D. Butler, Stephen Decatur, William Eaton, William Edmund ("Tiny") Ironside, Victor H. Krulak, Augusto C. Sandino, and Littleton W.T.. Waller. Within his narrative, he also analyzes the role played by each of various U.S. Presidents, notably Jackson, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and George H.W. Bush.

I also wish to commend Boot on his brilliant analysis of the pivotal (often decisive) role played by the Marines Corps throughout more than 200 years of U.S. military history and, especially, his explanation of the importance of the The Small Wars Manual which the Marines created in the 1930s. This handbook grew out of the their own experiences in the early years of the 20th century as well as Britain's colonial involvements. Here are two brief excerpts from the manual:

"As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."

"In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal -- the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. [The more ambiguous mission is] to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy."

Thirty years later, as the war Viet Nam continued, it became obvious (at least to some) that the lessons to be learned from The Small Wars Manual may have been validated but, for whatever reasons, were either ignored or forgotten by President Johnson and others in his administration. With a new century underway, given the events of September 11th, it will be interesting to see to what extent (if any) the Marines' Small Wars Manual will guide and inform the allied response to global terrorism.

With regard to "the lessons of history," Boot offers this advice in his book's final chapter: "In deploying American power, decisionmakers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble. Yes, there is a danger of imperial overstretch and hubris -- but there is an equal, if not greater, danger of undercommitment and lack of confidence. America should not be afraid to fight `the savage wars of peace' if necessary to enlarge the empire of liberty.' It has done it before."

Give War a Chance
The Savage Wars of Peace is a fascinating summary of the United States' successes and failures during 200 years and twenty-plus "small wars" from the Barbary Coast in 1801 to the Philippines in 1899, the Mexican border in 1915, the Yangtze Valley in 1927 and Kosovo in 2000. This well written book provides both entertainment and food for thought. Most of these "small wars", especially the numerous pre-World War II conflicts, are little, if at all, remembered. Even military professionals seem to have forgotten some of the principles and lessons learned which could have served us well in more recent forays.

Besides the entertaining narratives, Boot makes a convincing case that 1) murky conflicts without identifiable conclusions or "exit strategies" can lead to favorable results (although sometimes it takes hindsight to realize that), 2) fighting styles that limit casualties (on both sides) can achieve lasting results and 3) there have been far more undeclared "small wars" in American history than big ones and yet the professional military perceives the small wars as aberrations rather than the norm.

The Savage Wars of Peace makes a great jumping off point for detailed study of the individual campaigns. The 22-page bibliography plus 34 pages of notes provides many starting points for further research. My only criticisms are that I would like to see more photographs and maps, and the proofreader needs to check more carefully for a few date errors (e.g., on page 305 a Marine unit arrives in Vietnam in June 1966 and then engages in a significant action in September 1965; which year is correct? This type of thing occurs elsewhere.).

I thoroughly enjoyed this book and highly recommend it to everyone interested in U.S. history or military history and strategy.