Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #68999 in Books
• Published on: 1996-11-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 128 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780684825069
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Customer Reviews

modest size, MAXIMUM intellect
Reissue of a classic collection of essays from the 60's...Currents's "God and the Strongest Battalions" is alone worth the price!...Economic, political, social, etc., aspects are all considering by the "big-gun" historians of 40 years past...Scholarly enough for the serious student, yet very reader-friendly for the novitiate...recommended in the strongest possible terms!

What might have been?
It seems that much more attention is paid to debating the causes of the Civil War, but as this slim volume of essays reveals there are any number of varying and subtle arguments for explaining the outcome of the Civil War.

It is probably the common view that the North winning the Civil War was inevitable, that the overwhelming preponderance of the North in terms of supplies, industrial infrastructure, and manpower ensured victory. Only one of these authors somewhat accepts the thesis of Northern material superiority. These authors are far more mindful of the fact that mismanagement or deep-seated flaws within the losing side of a conflict can be larger factors in the ultimate outcome than positive actions by the winning side.

The authors all note some inherent advantages of the South: a need to only defend territory, the vastness of the South, a transportation network, the ability to produce large quantities of foodstuffs, a commodity, cotton, of great value in the international market, a huge labor force of three million slaves, and a certain psychological advantage in the defense of a way of life.

But these authors discuss any number of factors that led, not necessarily inevitably, to the defeat of the South. The authors point mostly to both military and political malfeasance, as well as personalities and inherent characteristics of Southern society, as leading to defeat. The manner of financing of the War produced tremendous inflation; the supplies of cotton were mismanaged both as a source of revenue to fund the war effort and as a tool to force European nations to recognize the Confederacy; food supplies were confiscated at below market prices; and manpower was poorly utilized both in recruitment to the Southern army and in the deployment of labor on Southern farms.

The states rights and independent political stance of Southerners seemed to prevent a coherent national posture being formulated in winning the Civil War. One of the authors points to the anti-statist views of all Southerners as interfering with producing a disciplined army. Southern units elected their superior officers and were disinclined to follow orders with which they disagreed. In contrast to this aggressive independence, some of the authors point to a general weakening of the Southern psychological state and even a "loss of nerve." The Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, is viewed by one author as a huge factor in the defeat of the South. Davis incompetently micromanaged the war effort, pursued flawed economic strategies, was personally difficult to engage, and exhibited an ineffectual indecisiveness and conservatism in times needing forceful and visionary actions. But the one-party system in the South prevented the rise of an effective opposition that could have addressed the original poor choice of President.

Beyond any material advantage, the authors generally contend that Lincoln and Grant were trump cards for the North. Both were better suited to their jobs both in temperament and competency than anyone in the South. Some would almost suggest that Lincoln and Grant being on the Southern side could have reversed the result.

This book was reissued in 1996 after first appearing in 1960, but it is as readable and relevant as anything being written today. There is some overlap in the material covered in the essays, but the ideas are interesting and challenging. You won't see all of these ideas in a general book on the Civil War.

Interesting, Thought-Provoking Collection of Essays
This is a slim book (approximately 124 pages) that contains essays by different writers who each examine a major factor that contributed to the South losing the Civil War. Although in hindsight it appears that the South was doomed to lose, in reality, it was a close contest that literally could have been won by either side. Although the North had significant material advantages, the authors point out internal factors and decisions made (or not made) by the South that contributed greatly to it's eventual defeat. This book, although originally published nearly 50 years ago, remains surprisingly relevant and thought-provoking today.

As an interesting aside, the forward to the book was written by retired Major General U. S. Grant III, the grandson of Union General (and later President) U. S. Grant.