Product Description

Jefferson Davis is a historical figure who provokes strong passions among scholars. Through the years historians have placed him at both ends of the spectrum: some have portrayed him as a hero, others have judged him incompetent.

In Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Steven Woodworth shows that both extremes are accurate--Davis was both heroic and incompetent. Yet neither viewpoint reveals the whole truth about this complicated figure. Woodworth's portrait of Davis reveals an experienced, talented, and courageous leader who, nevertheless, undermined the Confederacy's cause in the trans-Appalachian west, where the South lost the war.

At the war's outbreak, few Southerners seemed better qualified for the post of commander-in-chief. Davis had graduated from West Point, commanded a combat regiment in the Mexican War (which neither Lee nor Grant could boast), and performed admirably as U.S. Senator and Secretary of War. Despite his credentials, Woodworth argues, Davis proved too indecisive and inconsistent as commander-in-chief to lead his new nation to victory.

As Woodworth shows, however, Davis does not bear the sole responsibility for the South's defeat. A substantial part of that burden rests with Davis's western generals. Bragg, Beauregard, Van Dorn, Pemberton, Polk, Buckner, Hood, Forrest, Morgan, and the Johnstons (Albert and Joseph) were a proud, contentious, and uneven lot. Few could be classed with the likes of a Lee or a Jackson in the east. Woodworth assesses their relations with Davis, as well as their leadership on and off the battlefields at Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Atlanta, to demonstrate their complicity in the Confederacy's demise.

Extensive research in the marvelously rich holdings of the Jefferson Davis Association at Rice University enriches Woodworth's study. He provides superb analyses of western military operations, as well as some stranger-than-fiction tales: Van Dorn's shocking death, John Hood and Sally Preston's bizarre romance, Gideon Pillow's undignified antics, and Franklin Cheatham's drunken battlefield behavior. Most important, he has avoided the twin temptations to glorify or castigate Davis and thus restored balance to the evaluation of his leadership during the Civil War.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #467030 in Books
• Published on: 1992-10
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 384 pages

From Library Journal
In his highly readable, sometimes humorous account, which mirrors T. Harry Williams's classic treatment of Lincoln and His Generals (1952), Woodworth discovers a Jefferson Davis who is not as inflexible and indifferent to political needs as his contemporaries and later scholars have insisted, but one whose pride, misplaced loyalty to friends, and, in 1862-64, bad management undercut Confederate command in the West. Woodworth takes a fresh look at the canards and myths surrounding the man. His major new, and most controversial, finding is that Davis lacked self-confidence. A more assured Davis might have won the West and, with it, the war. The argument will fuel debates on the Civil War for some time. Highly recommended. History Book Club main selection.
- Randall Miller, St. Joseph's Univ., Philadelphia
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From the Back Cover
Winner of the Fletcher Pratt Award

"A long-awaited work on an important topic--a counterpart for T. Harry Williams's celebrated Lincoln and His Generals. Woodworth's conclusions are exciting. He writes in a good, clear style that should appeal to a wide audience. I found many passages to be pure pleasure to read."--Herman Hattaway, author of How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War

"Highly readable, stimulating, and at times provocative. This fast-paced and compelling narrative provides a very effective overview of Confederate command problems in the West."--Albert Castel, author of General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West

About the Author
Steven E. Woodworth is an assistant professor of history at Texas Christian University. He is the author of Civil War Generals in Defeat, and a two-time winner of the prestigious Fletcher Pratt Award, for his books Davis and Lee at War and Jefferson Davis and His Generals.

Customer Reviews

Boldly Written Account of a Crucial Subject
Seemingly endless Civil War books are written rehashing every minute move of Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. There are far fewer that cover the situation of the Confederacy's western armies and generals, despite, or perhaps because of the fact that it was in the west that the Confederacy lost the war. With Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West, Steven E. Woodworth steps up to fill this gap with a first rate book that every serious student of the Civil War should read. He presents a clear and reasoned argument that the failure of the Confederacy in the west was not due to the quality or quantity of its armies or even of its supplies, but a direct result of a monumental failure in its high command.
Woodworth writes of Jefferson Davis as a man who seemed to be eminently and uniquely qualified to become commander in chief of the Confederacy. He was a West Point graduate, a Mexican War hero, had served as a particularly effective secretary of war under President Franklin Pierce, and had been a United States senator. He understood politics, and he clearly understood war. His resolve for his cause, like his loyalty to his friends, was unshakable. Contained within these impressive qualifications and traits, however, were flaws and blind spots that would severely hinder Davis' management of the war in the west, where he had no Lee to take charge. Foremost of these faults was a lack of judgement when appointing friends as generals, and unreasonable loyalty to them thereafter. Compounding these problems was a fierce pride in his own military judgement that left him unable to acknowledge and correct mistakes. Finally, his pride led him into bitter personal feuds with key generals that hindered his ability to utilize them to the fullest.
Woodworth follows Davis' moves in the west, from his initial organization of the Western theater, through the high stakes game played and eventually lost to gain Kentucky for the Confederacy, to the crisis at Shiloh, where with the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Western Confederacy lost its best hope for competent command. The catastrophe of the loss of Vicksburg, the disastrous infighting among the generals under Bragg in the Army of Tennessee, the loss of Tennessee, the Atlanta Campaign, and Hood's final failed campaign are all covered. In each instance, Woodworth notes the command decisions that Davis made, or failed to make, in the crisis. At the end of each chapter, he summarizes and critiques Davis' performance, highlighting areas where Davis was at least partly responsible for the problems, as well as pointing out where he performed as well as could have been expected.
Woodworth clearly has a strongly opinionated point of view. He is nearly unique among the Civil War historians that I have read in his spirited defense of General Braxton Bragg as a competent commander, and lays all of the blame for the failure of Bragg's campaigns on incompetent and insubordinate generals under his command, chiefly Davis' personal friend General Leonidas Polk. He also repeatedly accused General Joseph Johnston of lacking a will to win, and of never believing that the Confederacy could win the war. While many will disagree with these positions, his boldness in stating them is characteristic of the bold approach that is evident throughout his book.
Jefferson Davis and His Generals is a bold, original work, that addresses a theme that is too often neglected in Civil War studies. It is consistently engaging, insightful, and controversial. It is clearly written, well researched, and a pleasure to read. I consider it to be among the very best books that I have read on the Civil War, and would recommend it highly, especially to those with a specific interest in the war in the west.

Theo Logos

A very good analysis of the Western Theater strategy..
I re-read Woodworth's excellent treatise on Jefferson Davis and his involvement in the Western Theater. The chapters are succinct and focus more on strategy than in specific battle details. My favorite parts are the reviews at the end of each chapter. I have always believed that Lee's strategy to invade the North rather than deploying his forces in the West was a major blunder. If there is one salient point that screams from this book it is that Jeff Davis' personal relationships with his generals (Polk??) definitely was a detriment to his decision making. This book should be required reading for high school and undergraduate students. Indeed any leader could profit from the analysis and history rendered here.

A Must Read
This book is a must read to understand the generals, campaigns, strategy, and the thinking of Jefferson Davis in the Western Theater. The book is well-written, informative, and features good analysis of the differing generals, Davis' actions, and some very good mini-biographies of the major players. Although the book does not go into major detail about specific battles, Woodworth does give a good overview of the major campaigns and battles of the West. The book also has some interesting theories on why Davis failed in the West. Although I disagreed with some of Woodworth's conclusions, especially regarding Braxton Bragg's capabilities as a commander, I found his arguments well-reasoned, although I thought he went out of his way to bash James Longstreeet. The major sticking point I had with the book was Woodworth's analysis on Bragg and his theory that J.E. Johnston thought the CSA's cause was doomed so he didn't really try to win. I thought that was utter nonsense, but that was really my only quarrel with the book. Well-written, informative, just an excellent book.