Product Description

The German Wehrmacht was one of the most capable fighting forces the world has ever known, but in the end it was no match for the Allies. Some historians contend that the Allies achieved victory through brute force and material superiority. But, as Peter Mansoor argues, all of the material produced by U.S. industry was useless without trained soldiers to operate it, a coherent doctrine for its use, and leaders who could effectively command the formations into which it was organized.

This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the United States to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes.

Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944–45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training.

The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #390946 in Books
• Published on: 2002-10
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 360 pages

From Library Journal
Famed war correspondent Ernie Pyle once said of the infantry, "They are the guys that wars can't be won without," and he was right. Now Mansoor, a U.S. Army colonel, has written a compelling history of American infantry divisions in combat during World War II in this debut book. Mansoor's focus is in opposition to the commonly accepted theory that Allied victory in the war resulted from the overwhelming weight of American materiel. He confirms the importance of technology, resources, and logistics but gives the American infantryman the credit for facing the crucible of battle against a skilled and determined enemy. From the mobilization of an understrength, ill-trained, and poorly equipped army in 1940 to the juggernaut of 69 infantry divisions by 1945, Mansoor provides a thoughtful and highly readable analysis along the bloody road to victory over the German army. A powerful story; strongly recommended for all public and academic libraries.ACol. William D. Bushnell, USMC (ret.), Brunswick, ME
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
A thoroughly researched study of the mythical GI (general infantry) in the European theater of WWII. Mansoor, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army who formerly taught military history at West Point, offers a fascinating look at the way in which the armys basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, commanded, and deployed throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in a better-than-average academic style. Mansoor skips the more populist approach of oral history and offers little that will satisfy the mass audience of Saving Private Ryan; rather, he sifts through hard facts revealed in the enormous trove of WWII documents to analyze the function of the infantry in action, and to describe how the military manned it despite a scarcity of resources and an abundance of operations competing for them. His principal findingthat it was the armys achievement to quickly mold citizens into soldiersis nothing new, but other conclusions will provide fodder for historians of the war for years to comefor example his argument that the army displayed an impressive ability to regenerate itself consistently and fold new recruits into existing combat structures. Another key move he highlights is the decision that individual army units had to be as self-contained as possible. Mansoor covers some admittedly well- trodden ground effectively and with a deft use of fact that the hardened reader of military history will enjoy and that any academic will appreciate. This valuable account, which rounds out the historical record of how the infantry fit into the war effort as a whole, deserves a spot on the shelves alongside the works of Stephen Ambrose and Paul Fussell. (14 maps, 32 photos, not seen). -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Review
"A compelling book well worth the attention of readers interested in the organization and training of an army for war." -- Parameters

"A provocative, spendidly researched, interestingly written account augmented with excellent maps and illustrations. Deserving of a wide readership." -- Choice

"A thoughtful and highly readable analysis. A powerful story; strongly recommended." -- Library Journal

"Merits reading not solely by students of history but by our military policy makers as well." -- Army History

"This valuable account deserves a spot on the shelves alongside the works of Stephen Ambrose and Paul Fussell." -- Kirkus Reviews

Customer Reviews

American Infantry - Queen of Battle
This is a rather comprehensive survey of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) in World War II, by a military professional still on Active Duty. His thesis is that the American Army (i.e., the Army of the United States) became better than the German Wehrmacht and defeated the Wehrmacht on those terms. Not taking away anything from the quality of the American GI and the American Army in general, or of the overall quality of his book, LTC Mansoor does not really make his case.
He refutes conventional wisdom, arising from a series of post-War interviews of senior German officers, that the American Army relied on the weight of materiel more than, in their view, the relatively poor fighting quality of the American GI to win the war. He discounts the materiel argument, but not convincingly. For example, see pages 214 and 237 for references, among others, to the dwindling quality of the Wehrmacht in the latter stages of the war. And while he acknowledges the improving quality and techniques and the USAAF ground support, he is virtually silent on the impact to Wehrmacht operations of Allied air supremacy after D-Day.
I think it's clear that the Wehrmacht (along with the Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe, etc.) were worn to a frazzle by the time of D-Day. Combine that with Ultra, and I think it's a tribute to the quality of the German soldier and the German military machine that they were able to carry on effectively at all until May 1945. The Wehrmacht of 1944-1945 was not the Wehrmacht of 1940-1941. There had been too many materiel and human losses, too many fronts, too much battering from the sky.
This is not to discount the positive attributes of the American fighting man and woman that he brings out. The American GI is the equal of the best this planet has to offer - always has been. Rather, the reason for the American Army's victory in Europe is a combination of both of these arguments.
I enjoyed his description of how General Marshall arrived at the decision for a 90-division Army. I also liked his description of the Mobilization Training Program, although I would have preferred more detail. The description of the many problems of scale (e.g., stripping divisions still in training of officers and men to be used as cadre for new divisions, problems encountered during POM (preparation for overseas movement), while not a new argument, are covered well. Discussion of these issues provide the beginning of understanding of the magnitude of the task facing the small, pre-1940 professional Army - the task of preparing to wage world war and achieve a victory as rapidly as possible. This was a humongous undertaking, to say the least. Despite the Monday morning quarterbacking, our senior military leadership on balance did an excellent job.
Now, he is critical of the "90-division gamble," particularly in the ETO, believing that it led to excessive casualties in battle since it left an insufficient number of divisions to rotate them out of the line for rest, refit, and effective introduction of replacements. This was exacerbated by our not adhering to the "Germany first" strategy. I thought we had, but he looks at the operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, and the Southwest and Central Pacific Theaters as demonstrating otherwise. Add to this the large number of men in the Army's service establishments, and, he argues, the American GI in ETO came up short.
This book is a gold mine of information, especially when read in conjunction with The Unsinkable Fleet. He has excellent coverage of the Army Mobilization Program (with which he has problems): its plans, constraints, problems, errors, and chaos. He discusses the stateside training program (individual and unit), and the constant turnover of personnel due to having to provide cadre for new divisions and replacements for divisions already deployed in combat. There was a common weeding out of ineffective commanders and staff at all levels during training (which unfortunately continued in every division in the early stages of combat). The replacement system was virtually counterproductive early on, with soldiers losing their training edge as they languished in replacement depots en route to their divisions. This improved as time went on, and he touts the end result of keeping divisions at full strength throughout the war. "The individual replacement system had its flaws, but these flaws stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept." (pg. 255) (I'm not not sure Stephen Ambrose would agree with this.)
He paints a picture of arrogance and confusion at the highest levels of command in the planning for D-Day. He reminds us that when all is said and done, no matter the extent and quality of planning, fire support, and logistics, success on the battlefield rests with individual soldiers, small units (platoons and squads), and, most importantly, their leadership. He also reminded me of how D-Day was a close-run thing, with victory wrested from the Wehrmacht by American infantrymen (with some fortuitous help from a few US Navy destroyer captains).
In fact, he is not very flattering of the Army's senior leadership at all. He feels they were not proficient at the operational level and too conservative at the strategic level. He uses as examples Montgomery's failure to open Antwerp earlier as a critical failure second only to the Allies' failure to close the Falaise Gap earlier. He also points to the Huertgen Forest debacle and the ensuing campaign to take Aachen, Eisenhower ordering Devers' Sixth Army Group to turn north when it closed to the Rhine rather than proceeding across it, and Eisenhower's and Bradley's failure to destroy more of the Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes after they had stopped the German offensive. His criticisms certainly are valid up to a point, but I think it's easy to criticize these decisions after the fact. (The Huertgen Forest campaign, however, does deserve all the criticism that can be heaped upon it.)
The end of the book brought an interesting surprise, as well. He debunks S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire and Marshall's conclusion that only about 10% of American riflemen actually fired their weapons at the enemy. I wasn't aware of this controversy, but apparently it's been building for a decade or so. He provides compelling arguments against Marshall.
Without question, this is an outstanding book, chock full of well-researched detail. A good read. Dock him one star for not supporting his thesis better.

A Thoughtful Appraisal of American Fighting Power
Mansoor has written a strong rebuttal to those who have been critical of the performance of the U.S. Army in the Second World War. It appears to be directly aimed at relatively recent historical analysis which unfavourably compares it with the Germany army. (At the forefront of such opinion is Martin van Crevald's academic monograph "Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army performance 1939-1945", but it is a view subscribed to by numerous other more "popular" writers such as the best-selling John Keegan.)

Lieutenant Colonel Mansoor limits his discussion to the Infantry Division, which after all formed the great majority of the eigthty-nine divisions fielded by the U.S. Army in World War II. He describes in detail the formation and subsequent training of these formations in the United States prior to being shipped overseas. The emphasis is on the importance of continuous effective leadership and uninterupted preparation for combat; he understandably again and again remarks on the deleterious effects of frequent command change and especially the stripping of older units to provide the core personnel of newer divisions. While these may have been unavoidable consequences of rapid mobilization, they inevitably resulted in trouble when the more experienced German Army was first encountered. By itself this segment of his book is worth reading since it provides a good summary of an important area that is often little commented on.

The bulk of the book, however, deals with the operational histories of the divisions once they were deployed in North Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe. By illustrating his points with numerous detailed examples, he wishes to convey the way in which units matured and grew in effectiveness as combat experience was gained and adaptations were made to new and often unexpected circumstances. He particularly pays attention to the role of superlative artillery, tank, air and logistical support, constantly reiterating the importance of a "combined arms" approach to prosecuting land war. Against this background, he further dwells on the extremely critical issue of personnel replacement and the problems and advantages of the approach adopted by the U.S. Army in Europe.

The final (and shortest) segment deals with a synopsis of his thesis that the fighting power of American Infantry Divisions was ultimately unparalleled and certainly second to none. It is here that perhaps his analysis does not quite match the depth of his preceeding much more lengthy build-up. No one can doubt the the final success of the American Army in its contest with Germany; and this by itself is compelling evidence of the effectiveness of its Infantry arm when combined with support from other branches and service. But somehow his discussion is perhaps not always as clearly convincing as one might expect. Nonetheless this book represents an important counterbalance to those on the other side who have often been unnecessarily and unjustifiably critical of U.S. Army fighting power.

(Incidentally, readers may find Mansoor's discussion of S.L.A. Marshall's contentious views on American infantry performance very interesting and informative. In his last chapter he provides some keen insights into the significance of Marshall's now largely refuted statement that only about a quarter of all combat infantrymen fired their weapons. He places this questionable idea in the context of Marshall's much more significant contribution in other areas.)

An awesome Analysis of the American GI in World War II
This book is an extremely thoroughly researched study of the legendary American GI in the European Theater of World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, a Battalion Commander in the US Army and former professor of history at the United States Military Academy, offers a fascinating and a quasi-reformist look at the way in which the army's basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, , deployed and commanded throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 is not only a beautifully crafted book, but more importantly it is a perpetuating addition to the latest revisionist rave where historians have claimed that the GI in World War II was better trained, equipped, and, most importantly, better led than their foe; Hitler's vaunted and often overly hailed Wermarcht. Mansoor's premise is that the American soldiers proved their capabilities in battle, which he correctly claims is the ultimate test for an army and a nation. "A fashionable argument in the past two decades has been that the Allies won World War II only through the sheer weight of material they threw at the Wermarcht in a relatively unskilled manner." Mansoor refutes this argument in this book first by dissecting the variables encompassed in the "combat effectiveness" formula and then quantifies the human, organizational, and technical capabilities of the opposing forces that fought in Europe. In the end Mansoor concludes that one of the most critical factors attributed to the American GI was his high level of endurance once engaged in combat. Referring to works by the likes of Bonn, Dupuy, van Crevald, and SLAM Marshall, Mansoor accomplishes where most of these great thinkers have marginally succeed; proving that the American GI in World War II was indeed superior to his foe. Mansoor achieves proving this thesis with an analysis that will most likely be used for years to come as THE single source to refer to when searching for a balanced comparison of the Allied GI and Wermarcht soldier. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in an academic style, but in the same light, highly readable. He brings the reader comprehensively through each stage of the war, from mobilization through pre-combat training, and then to the beaches of Normandy and beyond. He leaves no stone unturned in this complete analysis. This book was no doubt a major undertaking and Mansoor's hard work and focussed approach will undoubtedly " provide fodder for historians of the war for years to come." The GI Offensive in Europe should be shelved alongside the best historians of World War II. Academician's and military leaders must read this book for it proves that the superior training, organization, and execution of doctrine by the American Military units is what accounted for the unprecedented success of the US in 1945 and will continue to do so in the future.