Product Description

The German Wehrmacht was one of the most capable fighting forces the world has ever known, but in the end it was no match for the Allies. Some historians contend that the Allies achieved victory through brute force and material superiority. But, as Peter Mansoor argues, all of the material produced by U.S. industry was useless without trained soldiers to operate it, a coherent doctrine for its use, and leaders who could effectively command the formations into which it was organized.

This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the United States to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes.

Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944-45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training.

The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #368550 in Books
• Published on: 2002-10
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 360 pages

From Library Journal
Famed war correspondent Ernie Pyle once said of the infantry, "They are the guys that wars can't be won without," and he was right. Now Mansoor, a U.S. Army colonel, has written a compelling history of American infantry divisions in combat during World War II in this debut book. Mansoor's focus is in opposition to the commonly accepted theory that Allied victory in the war resulted from the overwhelming weight of American materiel. He confirms the importance of technology, resources, and logistics but gives the American infantryman the credit for facing the crucible of battle against a skilled and determined enemy. From the mobilization of an understrength, ill-trained, and poorly equipped army in 1940 to the juggernaut of 69 infantry divisions by 1945, Mansoor provides a thoughtful and highly readable analysis along the bloody road to victory over the German army. A powerful story; strongly recommended for all public and academic libraries.ACol. William D. Bushnell, USMC (ret.), Brunswick, ME
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
A thoroughly researched study of the mythical GI (general infantry) in the European theater of WWII. Mansoor, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army who formerly taught military history at West Point, offers a fascinating look at the way in which the armys basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, commanded, and deployed throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in a better-than-average academic style. Mansoor skips the more populist approach of oral history and offers little that will satisfy the mass audience of Saving Private Ryan; rather, he sifts through hard facts revealed in the enormous trove of WWII documents to analyze the function of the infantry in action, and to describe how the military manned it despite a scarcity of resources and an abundance of operations competing for them. His principal findingthat it was the armys achievement to quickly mold citizens into soldiersis nothing new, but other conclusions will provide fodder for historians of the war for years to comefor example his argument that the army displayed an impressive ability to regenerate itself consistently and fold new recruits into existing combat structures. Another key move he highlights is the decision that individual army units had to be as self-contained as possible. Mansoor covers some admittedly well- trodden ground effectively and with a deft use of fact that the hardened reader of military history will enjoy and that any academic will appreciate. This valuable account, which rounds out the historical record of how the infantry fit into the war effort as a whole, deserves a spot on the shelves alongside the works of Stephen Ambrose and Paul Fussell. (14 maps, 32 photos, not seen). -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Kirkus Reviews
"This valuable account deserves a spot on the shelves alongside the works of Stephen Ambrose and Paul Fussell."