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One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990

One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990
By George Baer

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Product Description

This is a history of how the Navy responded—in doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structure—to radical changes in political circumstance, technological innovation, and national needs and expectations.

Product Details

  • Amazon Sales Rank: #194574 in Books
  • Published on: 1994-08-01
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Hardcover
  • 568 pages

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal
Baer (U.S. Naval War Coll.) takes what could have been a dry topic-the policy history of the U.S. Navy-and turns it into interesting reading. He reviews the development of, and the problems inherent in, the policy decisions that shaped the U.S. Navy and, in turn, other naval powers. The book follows navy policy makers as they decide what the principal focus of the U.S. Navy will be and then determine the proper makeup of the fleet in order to ensure that the policy be carried out. One fascinating section involves the struggle to determine which branch, the Air Force or Navy, would control the nuclear weapons carried onboard navy vessels. With the strong focus on the policy history of the navy, this book would be valuable for libraries with strong naval sciences and history collections.
Terry Wirick, Erie Cty., Lib. System, Pa.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review
One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy 1890-1990 is a powerfully argued, object history of the modern U. S. Navy explaining how the Navy defined its purpose in the century after 1890. It relates in detail how the Navy formed and reformed its doctrine of naval force and operations around a concept articulated by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan - a concept of offensive sea control by a battleship fleet and (new to America) the need to build and maintain an offensive battle fleet in peacetime. The growth of a Soviet sea force in the 1970s and 1980s revived the moribund sea power doctrine, but the Navy's bid for strategic leadership failed in the face of the war-avoidance policy of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Navy finally retired Mahan's doctrine that the defeat of the enemy fleet was the Navy's primary objective. One Hundred Years of Sea Power is a history of how a war-fighting organization responded (in doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structure) to radical changes in political circumstance, technological innovation, and national needs and expectations. -- Midwest Book Review

Review

“A fine book: meticulous, judicious, incisive. It is a book to which the conventional exaggerations—“must” reading, relevant, if you’re only going to read one book on the subject, etc.—actually may be said to apply. . . . It is a study of the interactions of technology, bureaucracy, politics and culture, of how an institution adapts, or fails to adapt, to changing conditions. As such, the book belongs on a lot of desks at the Pentagon.”—Washington Times


“Baer takes what could have been a dry topic—the political history of the modern U.S. Navy—and turns it into interesting reading.”—Library Journal


“This is clearly one of the two or three most important works in American naval history published in the last decade; it has the potential to become a classic in the field. Well researched and carefully nuanced, it provides a distinctive perspective on the evolving historical relationship between national interest and national politics on the one hand and naval power on the other. Not only is this a significant contribution to scholarship—one that will critically influence how historians and political scientists think about American naval power—it is an enormously readable work. Baer writes beautifully, and he has organized his material effectively. The book is fully accessible to anyone interested in naval history.”—Edward Rhodes, Rutgers University

Customer Reviews

Ruling the Ocean Waves5
This book is a history of the U.S. Navy between 1890, when Alfred Thayer Mahan published "The Influence of Seapower Upon History," and 1990, when the Cold War ended. "The central thesis of this book, that the Navy, as any other agent of the government, is the instrument of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to dissociate itself from the broad national proposition is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and its strength" (p. 415).

The problem, as Baer explains, is that the political leadership--particularly in the first half of these hundred years--often failed to provide any guidance. The admirals of the USN muddled on as best they could, deducing policy from public statements of their civilian masters. War Plan Orange, a document that was constantly revised during the first half of the twentieth century, was the plan for going to war with Japan. Although it is easy to misinterpret the War Plan as a master blueprint for World War II, it was a USN document and developed without consulting the U.S. Army. It was not part of any national security strategy. That it ended up influencing the outcome of the Pacific Theater is a testament mainly to the analytical impact the document and related war games and other exercise had on the service.

Baer's account is broad. Most of his focus is on years of peace and the strategic application of sea power: roughly one-third focuses on events prior to World War II, another third to that conflict, and a final third to the Cold War years. He understands the nuance of strategy, foreign policy, and technological advances. The battleship dominated interwar planning not because of some linger sentimental attachment on the part of senior officers, but because it was the best and most accurate way of delivering firepower across big stretches of water. The aircraft carriers were still weapons systems in development at this time and the U.S. Navy turned to them in desperation only after December 7, 1941. In fact, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the stronger service during most of the 1930s and U.S. naval officers warned--with good reason--for that decade and as late as 1941 that they could very well lose to the Japanese. The USN got stronger only as the American economy grew recovered from the Great Depression, which gave the service the additional ships and men that it needed to fulfill its mission. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State were more concerned with political issues, than these operational matters, and were basically writing checks that the United States could not cash, at least for a year or two.

When war came Roosevelt was trying to do as much as was possible, but the Japanese were in a position to win the war had they had a better understanding of the indirect ramifications of seapower. Their mistakes, as much as American actions, were responsible for the outcome of the war. Baer gives proportional focus to naval operations in the Atlantic and is even more critical of German efforts, but does not forgive U.S. admirals for making mistakes about convoy protection that gave the enemy some easy victories.

Despite this massive victory, the USN lost its way during the Cold War years. Admirals thought the need for a strong navy was self-evident and were unable to coordinate the Navy's missions to national security strategy. The service was out of step with each succeeding administration. The number of ships shrank dramatically in the late 1960s and 1970s and the USN made a modest comeback at best during the Reagan years before the Cold War ended.

Baer's analysis and writing are impressive. This book is a serious one that many, many people interested in naval history and national security strategy should read, but the author's skills as a writer make it an enjoyable experience as well.

How it Happened, Why it Happened and Where You Get the Shirt.5
This is one of the most thorough and comprehensive (modern) American Naval Histories in existence to date. At ~550 pages, obviously little is covered in great detail, but Prof. Baer does an effective job of covering the periods in question with a deft hand that provides enough background to make the how and why of what the Navy did at the time make sense.

The most valuable part of this book however, is the fact that it is exhaustively noted and these notes and the index literally take up the last 90 pages of the book, making it _the_ guide to determining what primary sources and other histories should be your next stop for any subject, battle, commander or time period you are interested in exploring further.

Read it for a course, have already ordered a copy for my professional library. Highly recommended.