Product Description

The invasion of Korea by Japanese troops in May of 1592 was no ordinary military expedition: it was one of the decisive events in Asian history and the most tragic for the Korean peninsula until the mid-twentieth century. Japanese overlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi envisioned conquering Korea, Ming China, and eventually all of Asia; but Korea's appeal to China's Emperor Wanli for assistance triggered a six-year war involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers and encompassing the whole region. For Japan, the war was "a dragon's head followed by a serpent's tail": an impressive beginning with no real ending.

Kenneth M. Swope has undertaken the first full-length scholarly study in English of this important conflict. Drawing on Korean, Japanese, and especially Chinese sources, he corrects the Japan-centered perspective of previous accounts and depicts Wanli not as the self-indulgent ruler of received interpretations but rather one actively engaged in military affairs--and concerned especially with rescuing China's client state of Korea. He puts the Ming in a more vigorous light, detailing Chinese siege warfare, the development and deployment of innovative military technologies, and the naval battles that marked the climax of the war. He also explains the war's repercussions outside the military sphere--particularly the dynamics of intraregional diplomacy within the shadow of the Chinese tributary system.

What Swope calls the First Great East Asian War marked both the emergence of Japan's desire to extend its sphere of influence to the Chinese mainland and a military revival of China's commitment to defending its interests in Northeast Asia. Swope's account offers new insight not only into the history of warfare in Asia but also into a conflict that reverberates in international relations to this day.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #850642 in Books
• Published on: 2009-11-30
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 398 pages

About the Author
Kenneth M. Swope is Associate Professor of History at Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, and editor of Warfare in China since 1600.

Customer Reviews

Account of Imjin War mainly based on Chinese source
I have mixed feelings about this book. It does have some merits regarding detailed Chinese sources and the `Chinese perspective,' but the shortcomings far outweigh the positive.

You will have a hard time getting a clear picture about the Imjin War from this book. The author provides great details of the letters that Emperor Wanli wrote and memorials he received from his ministers and generals, but not much details of the actual war that occurred far away in Korean peninsula. In fact, the author writes, "its primary purpose has been to fit the Korean campaign into the context of ... Wanli's reign." Actually, I thought the book read more like a subchapter of `biography of Emperor Wanli,' than a description of the Imjin War.

If you really want to read this book, I suggest to first read either Turnbull's Samurai Invasion (2004 ed, not the 2008 ed) or Hawley's The Imjin War (2005), and then take it with a grain of salt.

It is not an easy read; I found myself skimmer thru pages on many occasions. For example, the author writes about ten (?) different possible explanations why Hideyoshi invaded Korea, giving a full discourse of every theory out there. Then, the author gives three different versions of the episode of Envoy Li ZongCheng's midnight escape. Sometimes I find it hard to grasp what he is trying to say. I prefer the author chooses what he thinks is most plausible and tell it to the readers instead of telling all other nine theories out there. And he repeats himself often with redundancy.

The author tries very hard to defend the Chinese army's reputation. In an effort to rebuke the Korean and Japanese source's claims that the Chinese were cowards and avoided combat, the author provides numerous quotes that praise the Chinese solders' bravery and the magnificent firepower of the Chinese cannons. The quotes by Korean king Sonjo that extolled the Chinese soldiers and commanders cannot be taken at face value. Chinese Emperor is like the heavenly god to Sonjo. Of course he has to `suck up' to the Great Wanli and his commanders. In fact, Sonjo was clueless when it came to military affairs. Whatever comments he made in that topic cannot be taken seriously. Most likely, the truth is somewhere between the `cowardly Chinese' and the `brave magnificent Chinese.'

Then, there are some annoying mistakes on historic facts. For example, page 61, at the end of the first paragraph: Yu Songnyong was the minister who strongly argued for alerting China of the Japanese threat, but the author says Yu was against it. Also, the author quotes, "As one of the Japanese chronicler observed, 'With respect to warships, those of China are the best, followed by those of the Ryukyus, and then Korea'." But in the Notes section, he provides a Chinese book as the source. I would think one should provide the original Japanese chronicle to add weight to this quote. There are too many books and information out there. The job of a historian is to find the most reliable source. You will find a lot of 'deception by selection: quoting only those that support your thesis (pro-Wanli/pro-Ming stance)' thruout this book.

In summary, this book does not provide a clear picture of the Imjin War. It does expose the readers to Emperor Wanli's court, but that is not what most readers signed up for when buying this book. To quote the author, "but those seeking a serious and nuanced understanding of this conflict, should best look elsewhere."