Product Description

Richard McMurry compares the two largest Confederate armies, assessing why Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was more successful than the Army of Tennessee. His bold conclusion is that Lee's army was a better army--not just one with a better high command.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #456570 in Books
• Published on: 1996-02-12
• Released on: 1996-01-17
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 222 pages

From Library Journal
The Confederacy's two major combat units were the formidable Army of Northern Virginia and the lesser-known Army of Tennessee. Lee's army was justly famous; the other lost nearly every battle it ever fought. McMurry studies the military, political, geographical, and logistical factors and decides that the Army of Northern Virginia was simply a better fighting force, even without Lee's tactical genius. This conclusion will be no surprise to Civil War students but his book does a careful job of confirming a widespread historical view. Recommended for academic and large public collections. History Book Club selection.
- Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles
Copyright 1989 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review
Sheds new light on how the South lost the Civil War.

American Historical Review

Indispensable for all future studies of Confederate military history.

Choice

McMurry's mastery of the literature is impressive, and his clear and succinct writing style is a pleasure to read.

Maryland Historian

Two Great Rebel Armies is that rare treat, a scholarly book that makes for enjoyable reading.

Ohio History

About the Author
Richard M. McMurry, a historian who lives and works in Roanoke, Virginia, specializes in the history of the Civil War in the West. His books include John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independence.

Customer Reviews

Interesting Look at the Two Largest Confederate Armies
Richard McMurry takes a look at the two largest armies in the Confederacy in what is, as the title indicates, an extended essay. The Army of Northern Virginia, ably led by Robert E. Lee, was able to compile a large number of impressive victories during the war. The Army of Tennessee, led by various men of less than stellar ability, was only able to win at Chickamauga, and even that victory proved barren strategically. The author considers various factors that affected the two, including geography, logistical concerns, leadership on all levels (particularly among lower level officers), pre-war militia systems in Virginia and Tennessee, and even the Federals who faced each army. He concludes that in every case, the Army of Northern Virginia benefited from these factors while the Army of Tennessee was negatively affected. I have seen it stated in several places that McMurry is saying that the men of the Army of Northern Virginia were better than the men of the Army of Tennessee. I did not get this sense from my reading of the book. Instead, McMurry is stressing that the men in leadership positions in each army were very different. The vast majority of the men who had graduated from military schools such as West Point, VMI, and the Citadel were concentrated in the Army of Northern Virginia to that army's immense benefit. The Army of Tennessee started out with many men who were untrained in the art of war, and that army's problems were exacerbated as casualties started to deprive it of even the small number of leaders who had that previous military experience. In other words, McMurry believes the raw material was there to work with, but the Army of Tennessee did not have experienced men available in large enough numbers to work with this raw material.

The last chapter of the book discusses the views of historians Thomas Connelly and Albert Castel on Robert E. Lee and also looks at the ways in which the Confederate government, specifically Jefferson Davis, could have prosecuted the war. McMurry sides with Castel in defending Lee from Connelly's attacks, and stresses that the Confederates were right to try to win the war in the east. With that said, the author believes the war was eventually won in the west by the Federals. I found it somewhat odd that McMurry would quote Connelly's entirely negative opinions on the western generals and agree with them while at the same time defending Lee from the same negative opinions. In a way, this did make sense, as it fits McMurry's own views on the generals of each theater. Perhaps Connelly is just a negative historian in general, however. Reading this book has increased my interest in Connelly's two volume history of the Army of Tennessee, and that set has moved much higher up my reading list as a result.

Overall, I enjoyed McMurry's short work, finishing it over one weekend in just three sittings. It really is startling to see how many trained military men ended up in the Army of Northern Virginia for various reasons at the expense of other Confederate armies. Likewise, it was illuminating to see all of the other advantages, intentional or otherwise, which were routinely provided to the Confederacy's largest army. This particular book is directed at students of these two largest Confederate armies and of Confederate grand strategy during the Civil War. I definitely recommend it to any student of the war.

One side or another?
The title definately underscores how masterful Mr. McMurray has been in detailing the main differences between the Army of Northern Virginia and The Army of Tennessee. From the basics of command on through key strategy and deployment, both armies are beautifully dissected by McMurray's research, mirrored with an easy to understand style of writing.

This book not only discusses how important the upper command structures were to both armies but how the various infrastructures such as railroads, food supply, communication and weapons production differed from east to west.

This book can be summed up as an impressive literary study of the two great armies. It sheds light on the many differences as well as similarities and gives the reader new insight into the complex study of military history.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in an intense study of both armies.

Well done Mr. McMurray!

Success and Failure in the Confederate Cause
Students of the American Civil War have long pondered the root causes of the illustrious successes of the Army of Northern Virginia in comparison to the miserable failures of the Army of Tennessee. For some, the answer is as simple as Robert E. Lee vs. Braxton Bragg (the comparison between the two is so compelling as to almost stifle further analysis). Fortunately, Dr. McMurry has delved into the subject with academic discipline and presented his results in this concise, convincing study - which, since its publication, has become a standard reference for later ACW histories from the academic community. Superior leadership - from the commanding general on down through the command structure, including experience, discipline and motivation of the regimental and company officers and their soldiers - was certainly a very large factor, but by no means the only important factor. The infrastructure of war (railroads, supply lines, communications) in the west was inferior for troop movements in a large area which was primarily still wilderness. Key areas in the west (Tennessee, Kentucky) were indefensible due to the existence of penetrating rivers - exploited by Federal naval gunboat superiority. Federal efforts in the west were much more organized, supplied and led (at least later in the war) than their Confederate counterparts. Dr. McMurry applies the academic method in presenting the appropriate statistics to support his conclusions. The final analysis by McMurry is persuasive: the South adopted a strategy of trading land for time in the west (where the war could not be won, but was eventually lost) for an opportunity to try and win the war in the east (where relative advantages and the best opportunities existed). This strategy seems to have been the South's best chance for victory in a war heavily weighted against them (in terms of military resources) from the outset. There is also a very interesting appendix which presents McMurry's views on the "Lee bashing" fad - initiated by Thomas Connelly, of late supported by Alan Nolan in his ridiculous "Lee Considered". Again, the disciplined academic view is the most persuasive in these arguments.