Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #656260 in Books
• Published on: 1984-07-30
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 232 pages

Customer Reviews

Tactical answer to a strategic problem
The book contains valuable sources, is well documented, and presents some good information, but it has some unpleasantly conspicuous problems. This book presents a mono-causal reason at the tactical level of war for why the Confederacy lost which is overly simplistic. Analysis of conflicts and their resolutions can rarely by tied to one cause - causes are normally woven together and to analyze one thread without the others creates an artificiality which negates any sincere analysis. This book conducts a sterile study of war at the tactical level without the influence of strategy, operational plans, politics, or economics which gives questionable results.
In the beginning of the book, the authors clearly state their thesis which is the only time that it is clear. They begin to present data in several different tables that are skewed. In presenting a case that the Confederacy suffered more casualties because they attacked more often, the authors include the 29,396 southern soldiers who surrendered at Vickburg (these soldiers were entrenched and never attacked). There is sufficient evidence to support their case without skewing figures - this only lessens their credibility.
After the first section, the thesis of the book seems to wander. Facts are presented but analysis is missing. Various issues of the war are well presented while others are biased and fail to present all of the evidence - some of the evidence does not support the thesis and some negates it. The combination of the rifle and fieldworks are proclaimed to be practically invincible. This becomes the primary thesis for most of the second section and the authors are more interested in proving this new thesis than supporting their original one. The South is accused of failing to learn from its attacks on entrenched positions while Gen Grant proceeded to charge them through the end of the war. Their logic is questionable, and they fail to ask if there were other reasons for these attacks. Did political pressure drive these attacks? What was the strategic objectives of both sides? None of these questions were addressed which all influenced the generals' decisions.
Some of the topics presented in the book are never woven back into the theme of the book. In discussing artillery, the authors were more interested in proving that the rifle was the sole cause of the Confederate losses rather than showing how the devastation caused by smoothbore artillery against attacking infantry supported their original thesis. Cavalry was discussed but only in terms of its ineffectiveness as shock troops against the rifle. The book did not discuss the effective uses of the cavalry (reconnaissance or raids) and it did not develop how the change in roles for the cavalry supported their original thesis.
The most glaring problem with this book is in the last chapter. This is where the true (hidden) thesis is presented - the Celtic heritage being the reason the South lost the war. The evidence presented is circumstantial and weak. The second to last chapter presented an excellent argument for why the Civil War generals' preferred to attack - they were young officers during the Mexican War where offensive action was decisive.
The original thesis does present a factor in why the south lost - they lost in attrition warfare. With a smaller population, the South had less men available and the cost of attrition warfare was greater. They did sacrifice too many men in charges but was there a valid alternative? The authors did not explore other options but locked themselves into hidden agendas which diverted them from fully exploring, supporting, and developing their original thesis.

Stretching Celtic Ancestory into the Confederacy
McWhiney and Jamieson use Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage to effectively stage a war between the American Englishman of the North and the American Celts of the South. The authors engulf themselves in the heritage and culture of the South and its ties to its Celtic ancestry. Their viewpoints on how and why the Confederacy lost so many men are saturated throughout the book. Their exposition on Civil War tactics and how they were altered or rendered ineffective by technology allows the reader to examine the challenges faced by the Confederate commanders and soldiers in a war being fought solely with spirit and ambition.

McWhiney's thesis is much more of a stretch. He examines the disastrous Southern military tactics which cost the Confederacy its independence and argues that the reason the South stuck to these tactics for so long had to do with the Celtic ancestry and folkways of Southerners and of Southern culture. He contends that "the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war making costly attacks more often than did the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used so successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860's because an improved weapon, the rifle, had vastly increased the strength of defenders. The Confederates could have offset their numerical disadvantage by remaining on the defensive and forcing the Federals to attack; one man in a trench armed with a rifle was equal to several outside it. But Southerners, imprisoned in a culture that rejected careful calculation and patience, often refused to learn from their mistakes. They continued to fight, despite mounting casualties, with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic ancestors for two thousand years. The Confederates favored offensive warfare because the Celtic charge was and integral part of their heritage....There was no glory to be gained from fighting out of a hole in the ground."

GOOD READ FOR SOMEONE WHO ALREADY HAS A GOOD BACKGROUND
Attack and Die : Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson is a good compliment to other more complete histories of the Civil War. In and of itself the book is too focused on its central thesis - that the South lost due to the compulsion of its generals to be on the offensive and the resulting high casualty rate. While these tactics certainly had a dramatic effect on the outcome, the authors fail to put them in to the proper context of other causes.

The strength of the book is in its description of the reasons for the Confederate strategy, and the failure of almost all Civil War generals to come to grips with the effect that the introduction of the rifle had on the upcoming battles. The authors trace the introduction of the rifle and the displacement of the musket as well as how the tactics that were used being generally premised on the musket. What was missing was any refrence to General Longstreet's plan for the strategic offense combined with tactical defense. This is exactly what Longstreet suggested to Lee before the second day of Gettysburg.

The most interesting part of the book is the last two chapters. The second to last discusses how the Mexican War experiences of the generals predisposed the participants to take the offensive, since that is how the Mexican War was won. The increased accuracy and killing power of the rifle made those tactics obsolete.

The last chapter is the most interesting, although the authors may have taken their conclusions too far. Their conclusion is that given the Celtic roots of the Confederate Generals that they were culturally programmed to take the offensive. While the cultural antecedents of the generals cannot be dismissed as a factor, the Celtic battles that the authors discuss took place generations before the Civil War.

This is a worthwhile read for someone who already has a good Civil War background.