Product Description

Back in print after almost 40 years, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, penned by David Galula in 1964, provides a systematic discussion of how to defeat the insurgent and the pitfalls along the way. Experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria as a French military officer and attache’ led Galula to consider the "need for a compass," and prompted him to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics." As relevant now as it was forty years ago when first published, Counterinsurgency Warfare could provide the template to defeat the insurgents and terrorists of today.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1324273 in Books
• Published on: 2005-03
• Binding: Paperback
• 143 pages

Review
The best “how-to” guide to counterinsurgency warfare. --Bernard Fall, Author of Street Without Joy, 1967

About the Author
David Galula was a French Army officer who graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939. A veteran of the North African Campaign and the liberation of Italy and France during World War II, he later went on to serve in China, Greece, Indo-China, and Algeria. He wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare as an International Fellow at Harvard University. Lieutenant Colonel Galula died in 1967.

Customer Reviews

Real world Look on Battling Insurgents
I picked up this book after reading the book "Fiasco", a book critical of the U.S. actions in Iraq, after the author noted that officers in the U.S. Military are currently using this book as a learning tool text book. Gaulle was a French veteran of WWII, Indonesia and served as a UN observer in Greece during an insurgent attempt to remove the government. He makes it very clear that the counterinsurgent (the government) in charge must win the battle for the population and that the soldier has a much more complex multi-dimensional role in creating trust within the population, creating security while not being too autocratic. He also states that successful adaptive leaders should be granted more local control on the ground allowing greater interaction. The author uses examples of insurgents from Algeria, Greece, and China along with an emerging U.S. Vietnam war that is evolving by the time the book was completed in late 1863. Gaulle notes that geography is a great aid to insurgents along with sympathetic borders. He also notes the classic insurgent method of intimidation; kill local politicians and police to make a greater impact on the masses, something well reflected in Iraq. On the other hand, he demonstrates how the Chinese Nationals treated their prisoners well, obtaining potential recruits, and how the nationals, upon gaining a territory would have a support administration prepared to go right in and set up. The Chinese nationals' organization abilities virtually provide a blue print for the counterinsurgents to follow. Although the text is 40 years old, written during the ruptures of colonial control of third world countries, it still is applicable today in the Middle East and elsewhere as a similar if not more sophisticated warfare is fought by insurgents, particularly those well supported, hence the major problem. The book is written in brief text book style and is a read most appreciated by those with a military background. Those without military experience or a technical appreciation may find it a not very colorful read. The book is very direct in its brevity with just 99 pages but a very insightful book in that short space. I purchased the paperback new for $28.

Modern day classic ...
David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice is a classic. It is a classic in the sense that it is ... a work of enduring excellence ...an authoritative source [Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary]. I recommend this volume because it makes better sense of other books on intelligence and special operations, by serving as a metric for both policy and operational analysis.

Written almost as a `good news/bad news' aphorism, Galula concedes ..."Very little is offered beyond formulas - which are sound as far as they go - such as, `Intelligence is the key to the problem,' or `The support of the population must be won." P xii.

The essence of the text is clearly stated ..."to define the laws of counterrevolutionary warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics." P xiii.

Galula begins by defining insurgency as ..."a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order ...it can no more be predicted than a revolution; its beginnings are so vague that to determine exactly when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political, and historical problem." P 5.

Vital decisions depend on the quality of the intelligence available to policy makers. Additionally, and possibly more importantly, intelligence must be evaluated and presented in terms of a practical application. Galula delivers on his promise, as Counterinsurgency Warfare systematically examines the theoretical i.e., strategic aspect of intelligence in terms of practical/tactical i.e., operational applications.

Never Has a Book Been More Relevant in Our Time
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice is perhaps the best textbook on how to fight a guerilla war (to read about how to conduct a guerilla war read Mao Zedong's On Guerilla War or Alberto Bayo's 150 Questions for a Guerilla). David Galua wrote this book. He was a French military officer whose experience in Algeria (during its war of independence from 1954 to 1962) has shaped his views on how to fight an insurgency. As a result, he has written a book that is credible, effective, and given today's current events, very relevant.
This book serves as an effective teaching tool for anyone interested in understanding how guerilla war (including terrorism) can be subdued. It short, well written, and presented in a format that is easy for anyone to understand. This contrasts greatly with current military literature of today (including the upcoming US Army's FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations which is, in my view, too big for a busy officer to read in a single day).
This book, along with Roger Trinquier's, Modern Warfare, should be included as part of every military officer's recommended reading list. Not only is this book thought provoking (i.e. in providing strategies in fighting insurgents), it is also relevant to our current struggle against international terrorism. This book should be treated as an important weapon in any warrior's arsenal.